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Introduction 
Continuous Economic and Political Challenges 
Since my last article was published, Iraq’s political situation has slightly improved, but terrorist 
attacks continue to inflict immense and painful loss of human life and cause huge damage of 
resources. Also, the sectarian violence and displacement have worsened, and the living 
standards have further deteriorated to unbearable levels. The dominant players of the conflict 
were trying to maximize their benefits by changing their military (violence) tactics, but not their 
strategic objectives. In this difficult, intense and historically crucial situation, the tough struggle 
continues for building a free democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq. 
Under the heavy pressure of daily vicious killings and property destructions, optimism is hardly 
shown by people as well as the enjoyment of individual freedom and public liberties; the only 
historical post-war achievement. Also, the attempted debate on democracy, future vision, and the 
relevancy of economic policies is fading. However, the escalation of terrorist attacks and 
persistent security problems demonstrate more the strategic geopolitical and economic 
importance of Iraq in the Middle East region and the world. It shows that loosing the war against 
al-Qaeda terrorism and anti-democracy forces would be grave to the Iraqis, the region, and the 
world in spite of its massive cost. Although the U.S. military capabilities maintain its superiority in 
Iraq, the country witnessed significant effectiveness of the Islamic terrorists and insurgents’ 
groups as well as increasing the burden of passive, inadequate, and hostile attitudes of 
neighboring regimes. The frequent discussions in the United States on possible withdrawal from 
Iraq and changing its strategy add more difficulties and confusion to the Iraqis, while encourages 
the terrorists and anti-democratic forces. 
The events also showed that despite the outstanding success of the general election of Dec. 
2005, expanding and deepening democracy practices need more concerted political and 
economic efforts. Such conclusion is also valid for Kurdistan Federal region. 
For centuries, the nations of Mesopotamia have experienced old fashion dictatorships. Hence, 
freedom and democracy have always been the noble cause of the people’s struggle in modern 
Iraq, especially against the oppressive Saddam’s regime and, thus, they were very optimistic and 
supportive to the new political regime. Iraqis have had high confidence in the promising prospect 
of political liberties and democracy before and after the fall of the former dictatorial regime by 
U.S., Britain, and other coalition forces. Such bright perception coupled with the assumed rational 
utilization of the country’s abundant resources, the living standards could have been substantially 
and quickly improved. Unfortunately, the hopes are fading as the new political and economic 
strategies and efforts have failed incredibly quickly. Even in Kurdistan region which enjoy high 
degree of security, the political and economic prospect is not bright. 
The purpose of the original article was to deal with the causes of this failure, particularly the 
irrelevance of Neo-Liberal macroeconomic policies, and offered alternative economic strategy 
and policies. The aim was two-fold; to increase economic growth and rebuild the infrastructure, as 
well as to reduce the economy’s high dependence on oil and condition oil utilization by only 
national economic criteria. Since its publication, violent events have not changed the given views 
and propositions. They are still viable for reflecting Iraq’s reality, people’s hopes, and dealing with 
the prevailing crises. Politically, it is hoped that the provision of well-defined economic strategy 
and consistent policies would empower the weak liberal, democratic, and social-democrat political 
groups to establish solid foundations and generate publicity for their economic and political 
programs. Obviously, the given views and propositions are radically departing from the applied 
fallacy Neo-Liberal economic policies. In this respect, it should be remembered that while the 
dominant Islamic political parties have neither scope for contemporary economics nor willing for 
social progress, they are exploiting the people discontent for promoting their vague objectives. 
Lessons from recent events are useful to elaborate earlier propositions as follows: 
1. Bad economic performance has sustained the politicians’ credibility problems and 
confirms the incompetence of the officials and foreign advisors for regulating the 
economy and managing the country’s resources[1], which reduces the citizens’ support to 
the government political initiatives. Significantly, the self-interest demands of the 
Kurdistan Federal Government—likely followed by new federal regions—in oil wealth 
remain without agreement on national economic criteria for its utilization. This position 
seriously undermines not only the conciliation political efforts and Iraq’s economic unity, 
but also would jeopardize the strategic goals for Iraq. Like the well-known strategic fault 
of the hasty call for the privatization of Iraq’s oil industry, the short-sighted and greedy 
interests of the KFG and foreign oil concerns in the exploitation of oil in Kurdistan region 
would have even more serious destabilization consequences. Such incredible economic 
policy confusion endures the vicious circles of violence, crime, and terrorist activities as 
well as further alienating the people. 
2. The experience also ascertained the worry of deepening the country dependence on oil 
revenues as excessive spending of abundant oil revenues has produced nothing, but 
more corruption. Economic failure has encouraged the (weak) politicians, incompetent 
officials, international organizations, and corrupted elements for more reliance on foreign 
loans and financial assistance. This is another negative aspect of the current economic 
policies.  
3. Economic success has a strategic influence and essential for having a fully functional 
state of Iraq. Therefore, urgent action is necessary to prepare the “Iraqi Reconstruction 
and Economic Revival Plan” on different bases from the Neo-Liberal economics. IRERP 
is neither new experiment nor an emergency one. Unlike the “National Development 
Strategy 2005-2007”, it is not a government annual budget. IRERP is a comprehensive 
scheme for the reconstruction of the country’s physical, social, and environmental 
infrastructure within long-term economic vision for transforming Iraq’s oil-rentier economy 
into a competitive free market economy containing positive social dimensions. Oil 
revenues should be the main source of IRERP finance. Considering past experience and 
facts, the IRERP should detail the reasons for the new economic strategy; objectives and 
policies, define institutional guidance and administrative measures, identify human 
development elements, as well as the priority programs and projects; e.g. the public work 
program for Sadr city, development of marshes land of Basra, Nassiryia, and Omara 
neighborhood, rehabilitation of manpower program, electricity, water, development of oil 
resources. It is assumed to be prepared by the proposed IDRC, and the projects should 
be implemented by the private sector. The details of macroeconomic policies must be 
elaborated by the ministries within the new strategy objectives.  
4. To explain the evolving role of the militias and identify the way for disbanding them, 
enough attention should be given to their salient social and economic features, especially 
for the popular Mehdi army. They are; poverty, high unemployment, and low living 
standards (lack of education, health, and public utilities and services).  
5. The present legitimate elected national conciliation government has nothing to offer the 
public more than to perpetuate its paralysis position. Because there are no single or 
coalition strong parties capable to assume active government responsibilities, external 
initiatives are necessary to guide the government for defining and performing its 
functions.    
The Strategy: Determinate Economic Plan Not Policy Cliché 
It looks adequately effective to deal pragmatically with the current crises in Iraq. Indeed, 
pragmatism dominates the thinking of Iraq’s policy-makers. However, a little thought on the 
relevancy of the “methodology” for analyzing Iraq’s crises may be essential to qualify this 
approach. 
In abstract, any complex military, political, and economic conflict can be defined, analyzed, and 
solved mathematically and quantitatively in terms of number of players, objectives, strategies, 
pay-off, and the rules of the conflict’s game. Rationality of the players is a pre-assumption in the 
contemporary conflicts. In most cases, optimal solutions could be realized for such classic game. 
In reality, however, the extraordinary situation in Iraq witnessed a different kind of conflict’s game. 
Iraq’s society is a multi-ethnic, and multi sectarian, i.e. there are different and interwoven political 
and economic interests, varieties of social values and culture. Also, the mainstream political 
parties that are engaged in the political process; the Arab religious Shiites and Sunnis, the 
nationalist Kurds, Kurdistan Islamic group, and the less influential secular and democratic parties 
are incapable of settling their political differences and determining their economic objectives and 
policies[2]. They offered only short lived non-substance slogans and repeat their hollow 
promises[3]. In addition, the public sector enterprises are either destroyed or operate under-
capacity, while the private sector is weak and lack entrepreneurship initiatives. They are very 
weak players and have little economic and political power. Only traders and small contractors are 
relatively active, but without political power. Meanwhile, the vast majority of people are 
unemployed and poor with little basic public services and utilities, whereas the economic, social, 
and political bases of the middle class and intellectuals are very small and ineffective. The 
government and public institutions are inadequate. Significantly, all concerned indigenous political 
players as well as the United States and foreign concerns rely on the availability of oil revenues 
as the remedy for existing economic acute problems. 
Excluding the complexity of foreign interventions, Iraq’s conflict is characterized by the dominant 
military, political, and financial power of the United States; Iraq’s strategic ally. As a main player, it 
can set up the rules of the game and recognizes (select) the players among many; the Iraqi 
people, political parties and groups, and business community. In normal situation, each player 
strives for its own objectives. However, in the current crisis, we have a unique conflict’s game that 
has simple features; a dominant player, one rule, one feasible solution, and no-exit strategy; i.e. a 
Jigsaw Puzzle (JP) static game. The prime objective (the picture) of the game is to build a free 
democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq. Like in most developing countries, leadership initiatives 
based on strong political will, knowledge, experience, and communications skill are essential to 
cope with the dynamics of Iraq’s political and economic situation. Thus, a realistic JP picture, i.e. 
IRERP initiative, which draws the road map to alleviate poverty, increase employment, 
reconstruct the infrastructure and improves public services and basic utilities, is very crucial for 
ruling Iraq successfully by Iraqis and help to end the military occupation quickly. If such economic 
endeavor were to be successful, it would reassert hopes and provide the necessary condition, 
though not sufficient, to ensure individual freedom and promote democracy as well as improving 
quickly the living standards. Otherwise, Iraq’s survival would face a terrible future. 
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